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Abstract
Technological literacy has been given increasing attention in recent literature on the technology
curriculum. This paper focuses firstly on some discussion of one of the most commonly accepted
definitions, which seeks to explicate technological literacy in functionalist terms. It then goes on to
consider some of the metaphysical assumptions underpinning the techno-scientific framework which, it
is argued, threaten to impoverish our understanding of that framework and consequently any view of
technological literacy developed within it. A view of technological literacy is then developed which
presents it as the resultant of an active engagement in the construction of meanings.  It is argued that this
is a form of technological literacy which aims to inculcate the creative skills essential to the forming of
a constructively critical perspective on the techno-scientific framework.
Problems of Definition
'Technology' as a concept appears  to suffer from a
lack of clarity in terms of both breadth and depth;
the  'breadth problem' arises partly out of the fact
that technology is, as some commentators have
suggested1, a 'vaguely articulated construct' that
tends to be resistant to attempts to sharpen it up.
This may be because it  is an inherently vague
notion, or it may be just 'blurred' at the edges in that
there are many things quite properly referred to as
'technological', but that, in a society which has
come very largely to define itself in terms of techno-
scientific activity, the boundaries of the
'technological' are not easy to draw. Alongside the
problem of 'breadth' is one of 'depth': this arises out
of the sheer range of skills and knowledge coming
under the umbrella heading of  'technology'.  Should
we construct a 'hierarchy' with the more 'important'
technologies higher on the curriculum agenda? If
so, which comes higher? Should we adopt the
catch-all approach so that 'literacy' entails at least
some understanding of all or most  'technology'?
What kinds of knowledge? What kinds of
understanding? Should 'depth' entail a 'mix' of major
and minor? What kind of balance in this case? To
answer some of the latter questions presupposes
we have managed to find some satisfactory solution
to the issue of breadth.
One route out of these difficulties is to suggest that
'technology', [like, for instance, the notion of 'game']
has a 'family resemblance' character2; there is no
one essential set of defining characteristics, and the
boundaries are continually being redrawn anyway.
On this view, 'technology' is not so much lacking in
clarity as a construct, but, rather, an inherently
heterogeneous mix of skills, traditions and activities
permeating, and interacting with society and culture
in indefinitely many ways. I do not mean to imply an
arbitrariness in this; indeed, the varieties of
technological expertise interlock in many subtle
ways, and the history of their development is itself
a vital aspect of the history of our culture which
needs to be incorporated into any programme of
technological literacy.
Technological Literacy
Nevertheless, the term 'technological literacy' is
generally taken to imply an understanding
commensurate with the application, function and
role of   technology in contemporary society. The
analogy is with functional competence in the domain
of literary activity, and is useful in drawing our
attention to those aspects of technological
understanding having a specifically functional
significance; just as some, at least, of the criteria of
literacy require the individual to have some
competence with [say] grammar and syntax, so the
technologically literate will possess certain functional
competences.
Likewise, just as we can consider varieties and
degrees of functional literacy, so we can also apply
such notions to the domain of technology.
Functional technological literacy can thus take a
variety of forms: for example, a minimum know-
how in terms of operational familiarity with the
everyday paraphernalia of life [washing machines,
video recorders, word processors etc.];  or some
capability, or knowledge considered essential in
some way for an individual to function in some
specific techno-environment; again,  an awareness
or appreciation of the development of some kind of
overview of technology in context;  finally, a high-
level understanding and skill with the technical
working vocabulary and principles of a specific
technology or  range of technologies [eg information
technology]. This list isn't intended to be exhaustive;
but the 'grammar' and 'syntax' of  these varieties and
levels of functional competence may range from
the basic to the highly sophisticated.
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This  indicates that functional technological literacy
may be characterised in various more or less distinct
ways, eg:
• Technology-as-doing
• Technology-as-knowing-about
• Technology-as-awareness
And, just as literacy itself is a vital functional
prerequisite for the individual in society, so various
forms of technological literacy may be also, eg:
• As a condition of participation in contemporary
society
• As empowering the individual
• As an essential adjunct to economic survival
[both personal and societal]
• As a condition-of-being-in the techno-scientific
framework
So much for functionalist interpretations of
technological literacy; functional technological
literacy could be seen as 'liberating' for the individual
in various ways. But on the other hand, it might
equally be seen  as providing mechanisms of social
control 3 . There is a possibility  that this kind of
'functional' competence, far from empowering or
freeing people, might serve merely to bring them
more conveniently under the control of the
contemporary state,  since technology may also be
conceived as a means of both defining and
controlling the status, capability, actions and even
the social space allowed or appropriated to the
individual. Worse still, we also have to reflect on the
gloomy possibility that the postmodernist
postfordist dream 4 of a liberated high-skill and
technologically literate workforce may well be at
odds with the reality of a high-tech environment in
which more sophisticated technology actually tends
to 'de-skill', thus reducing the level even of  functional
literacy 5.
Finally, aside from the possibility of state
intervention, benign or otherwise, functional literacy
is also at the mercy of other groups within society,
each with particular ideological axes to grind 6, and
which might threaten the impoverishment of any
notion of technological literacy. In short, if we
constrain ourselves to functionalist interpretations
of technological literacy, we may find ourselves
beset with a number of  intractable problems.
The Metaphysics of the Techno-Scientific
Framework.
Apart from worries about state control or ideologies,
certain kinds of metaphysical assumption also
threaten to impoverish our conception of the
techno-scientific framework, and  this in turn
threatens to constrain and impoverish notions of
technological literacy. These  assumptions can be
classed under deterministic, constructivist, and
deconstructionist headings. Each can be damaging
in different ways. Determinism in one form or
another tends to pervade popular views of science
and technology. Science is seen as progressing in
more or less linear fashion towards ultimate truths
about the natural world; and technology is perceived
as a juggernaut unleashed by science in the pursuit
of an ultimate utopia [or nightmare]. These are not
easy assumptions to dislodge, as I have argued 7  but
they need to be challenged; techno-scientific
determinism relies mainly on meta-inductive and
reductive arguments. I do not have space to deal
with reductionism here, but this has been very ably
criticised elsewhere 8. However, meta-inductivism
holds that the only satisfactory explication for the
success of the natural sciences at least, is that the
causal mechanisms and entities postulated by them
are at least approximately true. This entails a realist
view of scientific theories; even if our current
theories are not strictly true, science is at least
progressing towards ultimate truth about the natural
world.
The trouble with  this, is that whatever 'ultimately'
exists may do so regardless of our capacity to
construct explicatory theories; this meta-inductive
hypothesis cannot be open to refutation in any
ordinary sense since even if all our theories were to
be refuted, it could still be consistently maintained
that science might eventually succeed in generating
true theories. As an hypothesis it does no work;
meta-inductivism is vacuous, and as a critique of
progress in science, it has come under sustained
attack from various quarters 9, 10. More generally,
convergentist critiques of scientific progress do not
stand up either to philosophical analysis, or the
evidence that comes from a study of the actual
history of science 11. The universe, for the disciple of
determinism, is a closed one; the technological
corollary of this is the 'megamachine' 12  with
everything [and everyone] locked finally into place;
literacy in such a domain would suffer the same
deterministic fate. But  techno-scientific activity,
although continually opening up new domains that
are conceptually richer, and thus in this sense
progressing, need concede nothing as to the
'ultimate truth'. We don't have to accept the
metaphysics of determinism in order to make sense
of the techno-scientific framework.
Against this we might consider the social
constructivist 13 approach to the notion of a
technological literacy which  seeks to explain the
products of science and technology as resultants of
social processes.  The purposes, meaning and nature
of those products is, according to social
constructivism, decided through a consensus  which
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emerges among the differing social groups involved.
However, the language within which talk of various
possible interpretations of techno-scientific activity
goes on must itself provide  a relatively fixed and
stable framework in order to make such talk a
possibility in the first place, and it is far from evident
that this  stability is arrived at merely through 'social
consensus'. Truth is not fixed by conventionalism
any more than it is fixed by determinist metaphysics.
The social constructivist approach to explicating
techno-scientific development is threatened with a
slide into the anarchy of a total relativism, and this
can open up the prospect of a deconstructionist 14
attack on the very idea of a stable language wherein
any intelligible critique of the techno-scientific
framework might be developed. The case for
deconstructionism is that the meanings of all terms
within a language are indefinitely defeasible. One
'interpretation' can always be substituted for another
and so on indefinitely. The result  according to
deconstructionism is  an endlessly shifting morass
of 'meanings' from which it is impossible to
command  a  clear  view.  Language  is  a  labyrinth
from which there is no escape. However,
deconstructionists cannot in consistency even
formulate their case, since any such attempt
undermines the very view they wish to put forward.
To present an argument for deconstructionism is to
invoke the very criteria of language-stability they
claim to reject. There is thus literally no reason why
we should accept the deconstructionist position.
The Construction of Meaning
If we are to command a clear view of the potential
power of a true technological literacy, we need to
avoid the pitfalls of determinist, constructivist, and
deconstructionist metaphysics; each threatens
impoverishment in one way or another because
each impoverishes our conception of the nature
and working of language, including the techno-
scientific vocabulary. Wittgenstein offers a
conception of  the countless different 'games' played
with natural language which both undermines these
metaphysical traps, and also captures  the actual
characteristics of living, growing languages. I cannot
do justice to the subtlety and complexity of his
account here, but there are some features which I
believe serve as useful signposts.
Firstly, many 'language-games' interlock  to yield
pictures of varying degrees of richness. At the basic
functional level, learning, for example, to make
observation reports precedes other more
sophisticated 'games' with language such as 'imagine
that...' and likewise the effective use of, for example,
metaphor or simile presupposes a grasp of these
yet more complex and sophisticated language-
games. There is an ordering in the acquisition of
such skills; they are not all on the same level and
their mastery is a very gradual process.  We would
not normally regard the learner who had so far only
acquired skill in the observation-report language-
game as 'literate', because we recognise that  literacy
is also concerned with a grasp of the complex and
multi-levelled interplay of different language-games.
Although there are 'rules' for the uses of our
language-games, and for the varieties of
'constructions' therewith, such rules are neither
fixed nor all encompassing, as Wittgenstein2 stresses.
Secondly - and this is what, I think, rescues us from
the earlier mentioned metaphysical traps, and
enables us to push notions of technological literacy
beyond the merely functional- literacy is not merely
concerned with functionality as such but also with
the construction of meanings. Literature is itself a
paradigm of this latter kind of activity, and it has
frequently been employed to construct critiques of
the techno-scientific framework.
 I will use Charles Dickens as an example to illustrate
this. Dickens was concerned, in Hard Times 15  and
other novels with what he saw as the dehumanising
effects of industrialisation, and a society apparently
obsessed with laissez faire economics and
mechanistic utilitarianism. He uses irony, parody,
and caricature [among other language-games] to
systematise and order a complex and disparate set
of circumstances, events and artefacts, thereby
offering a particular interpretation. Now, it might
be said that Dickens' interpretation of some of the
effects of  nineteenth century technology is just one
more interpretation amongst a potentially indefinite
number of such interpretations. Does this mean
that, after all, anything goes and that
deconstructionism is right? Not at all; to begin with,
Dickens draws  upon many  of our shared language-
games; these interlock and fit together in particular
kinds of way, and Dickens makes superlative use of
this fact. His critique not only engages with the
situation he describes, but also yields a rich and
compelling picture which provokes the reader into
further reflection precisely because the reader shares
this framework of language.
Secondly, although we can of course reject Dickens'
reading, any such rejection, if its is to mean anything,
must be based on some kind of assessment and this
itself presupposes a shared form of communication.
Agreements, as well as disagreements, acceptance,
rejection and so on, perforce take place against the
shared background of a relatively stable  framework
of language. But there is a more centrally important
point in relation to this, a point which not only
undermines the impoverishing metaphysics of
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determinism, but helps clear away the muddles of
the social constructivists.  In offering this 'picture' of
nineteenth century technology and industrialised
society, Dickens is not merely mirroring a pre-
existent reality; his picture is a creative construction
with a constitutive relation to what is pictured. The
picture he offers us not only draws upon what is
pictured, but in the process transforms it. What is
pictured here is never the same again after it has
been touched by Dickens' vision. This is not a
picture determined in advance, nor is it arrived at
through a consensus; but when we properly take in
this picture, we ourselves see with 'new eyes' as it
were. What this indicates, is that our language-
games are not merely static; they actually have great
transforming power, to renew and regenerate
themselves; and literacy is the key to the unlocking
of this power. But we need to understand better the
nature of this power and free it from the clutches of
an impoverishing metaphysics.
Now, we may nevertheless be tempted into thinking
that, although Dickens is indeed commenting on
the society of his day and offering new insights into
the condition of that society through creative
constructions with language-games, this does not
really apply to language-games in the techno-
scientific framework. Well, to begin with, I hope
that it is plain from this discussion, that the critique
of a writer such as Dickens is indeed an essential
dimension in any  programme dealing with
technological literacy. But  the points I have tried to
make about the nature of the language-games
employed by Dickens apply equally to those
specialist languages within the techno-scientific
framework itself. The language-games we play with
calculation, mathematics, empirical observation,
testing, prediction, simplicity, symmetry, and so on,
form stable, pre-existing elements alright; but from
which, nevertheless, new 'pictures' can grow. And
new pictures in this sense, open up entirely new
domains, as any careful research into the history
and growth of the techno-scientific framework will
show. The construction of meaning entails an active
striving towards new perspectives. This is no mere
tracing around the framework of a fixed and
immutable language. Language must continue to
grow in order to live, and this is as true in the
techno-scientific framework as in any other. This, I
think, points to the need to incorporate into the
curriculum a notion of technology literacy that aims
not merely to produce 'functionally' literate
technologists versed in various skills and disciplines,
but also one which aims to get the active engagement
of the learner in the creative processes  essential to
the forming of  constructively critical perspectives
through which  meaning can be infused into the
techno-scientific framework itself.
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